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After a long period of oblivion that lasted for much of the second half of the 20th century, border studies over the past 20 years have once again become a fertile topic of discussion and debate, as national and international politics have brought them to the forefront of our news media. While knowledge about borders is growing steadily, their constant evolution invites scholars and practitioners alike to continue to revise ideas about what they represent for us and what they do to our lives. Following historical attempts to draw a universal understanding of the international border (Ancel, 1938; Foucher, 1986; Guichonnet & Raffestin, 1974; Martinez, 1994; Prescott, 1978) , the focus has been on border dynamics, essentially that of debordering and rebordering (Amilhat Szary & Fourny, 2006; Kaplan & Häkli, 2002; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Popescu, 2011) . However, the multiplication of borders seems to induce a shift from fixity to multi-location (Balibar, 2009; Squire, 2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2008) . Through these processes, what appeared to be a linear divide loses its traditional topography, symbolic power and function as it disseminates in a reticular and relational manner that is always renegotiated in a way that could lead us to envision the border as 'mobile'. We have been calling for a research agenda on the mobile border since one of our research projects bore this expression in its title in 2008, which was soon followed by preparations for an important international conference, the XIth meeting of the 'Border Regions in Transition' (BRIT) network (Amilhat Szary & Giraut, 2011) . The apparently oxymoronic expression that is 'mobile border' could impose itself because a growing number of scholars are confirming that the contemporary border can only be grasped through its portativity and a change of focus toward the individual and his/her personalization of a mobile device (Agier, 2013; Cuttitta, 2006; Jones & Johnson, 2014; Steinberg, 2009; Weber, 2006) , and also because of a developing awareness that mobility is imposing a new understanding of the social (Büscher, et al., 2011b; Retaillé, 2005; Söderström, et al., 2013) . In that respect, a detour through some of the 'hotspots' of border studies may prove to be relevant to the goal of shedding light on the project of this book. A renewed deciphering of the most famous examples of hard borders, such as the US/Mexico divide, as well as soft borders, such as the Franco-Swiss border within the Geneva cross-border metropolis, may be revealed to be less orthodox than expected.
Questions raised by a short illustrative detour
Within one of the most cited examples of cross-border integration, namely the Geneva metropolis, various actors stand alongside, and interact with, one another. Very different relations and regimes of border living and border crossing co-exist in that region: traditional elites of the old Calvinist city state view themselves as being responsible for the upkeep of its international vocation and the provincial qualities that co-exist with each other. The global leaders, managers and traders of the international institutions and financial services co-exist with the French border workers who have assumed an important share of local employment in the past few decades, and both the old and new migrant workers held their national flags with pride at the ephemeral 'fan zone' of the recent soccer World Cup. The new Swiss borderers cross the line to France in search of cheaper accommodation, while the xenophobic activists call for closed borders to serve their objective of social upliftment. In this context, border issues can and should be addressed as the expression of complex layouts and the confrontation of different individualized regimes of crossing, but also of access to rights and resources.
At the heart of what can be considered as both one of the primary examples of walled borders (Rosière & Jones, 2012) and an authentic 'border society' (Dear, 2013) , the regions around the line separating the United States and Mexico also bear witness to a growing complexity. Shifts in spatial and temporal scales are needed to perceive the border in its multiple forms, functions and implantations. This border dwells on the superposition of vast sets of technologies of control, and valorization over culturally hybrid 'borderlands', traditionally grasped through migratory chains between hometowns and destination cities. It now expands through its connections to spreading maquiladoras, special police in airports and border areas, and drones from both cartels and border patrols. The production of differentiated norms occurs in complex transnational circuits embedded in the flows of migrants and (more or less legal) goods. What may henceforth appear to be a ubiquitous border raises difficult theoretical and conceptual challenges that call for the mobilization of the spatial figures of layout, dissemination and projection. The advent of a mobile border -and its consequences, the diversification of ' borderities ', provisionally defined here as the multiple rules and experiences of what a border can be -creates the framework for the questions this volume seeks to address.
These recent evolutions can hardly be understood, both methodologically and conceptually, with too classic a toolbox. What is at stake is not a change of focus or a shift from state to everyday life approaches, nor is its purpose to attain a universal model of borders. This book is part of a recent effort to help formalize a truly epistemological body of thought about borders, which answers the call for theory in the field, a call that has gone unheeded for a decade (Newman, 1999 (Newman, , 2003 , and strengthens the hypothesis that borders constitute a relevant laboratory for studying socio-spatial relations and could ultimately lead to border analysis in terms of models (Brunet-Jailly, 2005; Hamez, et al., 2013) . Its project may be even more ambitious: confronting borders with mobility lenses and the individualization processes they induce incentivizes the exploration of a renewed political and cultural geography of continuities and discontinuities, no longer based on the identification of spatial objects through their boundaries and their links, but functioning on the basis of categories whose property is to remain invisible. What if the world was not divided by lines whose visibility gives a sense of political balances but was structured by limits that are constantly being redefined?
The idea of 'borderity', a new term forged for the purposes of discussion, is intended to help develop an analysis that would throw off the constraints of the tautological relationship between territory, state and borders, by which the definition of any one term of this triptych is based on the existence of the other two. For that reason, the potential deconstruction of this triangle may reveal radical political content. Border studies may no longer be building geopolitics as praxeology but, on the contrary, may lead to the highlighting of spaces of critical intervention in a globalized world where ideological debate often hides behind narratives of efficiency and competitiveness. This volume seeks to understand how border studies' tautological binding of territory, state and border has prevented thinking 'border politics', and set the conditions for exploring the conditions of renewed border politics.
Identifying two foundational paradigms of contemporary border studies
We clearly belong to an era that has seen the destabilization of a world order based on the quest for a stable balance between states, an era whose spatial alphabet has relied on dividing lines in the form of borders (or dyads). This first paradigm of contemporary border research is a processual one that relies on two phenomena (the opening and closing of borders) that were long thought to oppose one another, until border studies finally concluded that both these phenomena could affect the same border at the same time. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which marked the end of the international bipolar opposition that had prevailed during the Cold War, the general consensus was that walls would disappear and borders would open. This hope was reinforced by the technological progress of the 1990s, which saw the rise of the Internet and mobile communications as well as the generalization of flexible commercial and financial regulations, leading to what some dared to call the end, not just of territories and borders, but more broadly, of distance and geography (Badie, 1995; Moore, 2003) . What we have witnessed since then is in fact the opposite: a short remission (destruction of a few Cold War barriers) was followed by both the multiplication of new walls (Bigo, et al., 2009; Brown, 2010; Ritaine, 2009; Vallet & David, 2012) , the most visible aspect of this phenomenon, and the creation of new borders through 'balkanization'. The temptation of borders (to both create and use them) remains very real at all levels of the new territorial production sets (Antheaume & Giraut, 2005) . One of the main conclusions of border studies is that the debordering/rebordering processes are concomitant and happen simultaneously everywhere (Wastl-Walter, 2012; Wilson & Donnan, 2012) .
Contemporary borders obey a second paradigm, one that has certainly attracted fewer academic studies, possibly because it is intuitively more difficult to understand. The forms and functions of borders no longer coincide. Borders were invented to materialize the terms of a set of political conventions, whereby the balance of forces allowed for a distinction to be made between two political bodies. Whether the origins of borders are to be found in the walls of the first Sumerian cities 4,000 years ago or in the boundaries invented by European sovereigns with the signing of the treaties of Westphalia that marked the end of the Thirty Years' War and the start of a quest for territorial stability on the continent, borders appear as arbitrary figures that embody a range of functions. They at once materialize primary anthropological divisions between one Copyrighted material -9781137468840
Copyrighted material -9781137468840 social group and another, embody economic needs (to control and tax commercial exchanges) and constitute visual elements that contribute to landscape differentiation. It has been shown that it is no coincidence that the 'invention' of modern borders occurred at the same time as the emergence of more accurate maps that allowed new political artifacts to be drawn. Over the centuries that followed, border functions were located on fixed boundary lines and were often concentrated at points that enjoyed a distinct regime: the 'doors' of the house were obviously its main points of entry (besides the windows and the chimney). The border posts, however, could not function in an isolated manner and had to be linked to a decision center, making them appear peripheral. The metaphor of the house may help us better understand the contemporary confusion about the relationship between border functions and forms. The border functions of division, regulation and control have not changed as much as their place of enactment. The house is now linked to the world through a multiplicity of networks that penetrate its walls through electrical and fiber lines or satellite linkage. Who has not experimented with their mobile communication device to see how many networks will appear on their screen? This does not mean, however, that houses collapse or that anyone can enter, even only electronically, any type of space. Moreover, inhabitants of the same house can each construct their own bordering/debordering experience. The terms and conditions of spatial ordering have been seriously shaken, and it is time to rethink the border.
Most critical thinking on the evolution of borders concentrates on the impact of technological change on border functions (Johnson, et al., 2011) , often interpreting it as a virtualization of world power relations. Seldom have any efforts been made to relate this topology to some kind of spatial anchoring that all networks are subject to (Popescu, 2011) . The two paradigms that we identify here lead us to confirm that contemporary borders have not become dematerialized and should be analyzed through their viscosity and friction in relation to the multiple dimensions of space. Walls and barriers are only one part of this phenomenon of controlling access, the other being that surveillance ' dispositifs ' (or sets of techniques and practices in the Foucauldian sense) rely on hard devices to support all networks and the topological circulation of information. Borders have not disappeared from our landscapes, and they are not virtual: the need to see the border persists (Amilhat Szary, 2012). However, the material expression of the border does not always coincide with its functions, which become more diffuse every day: the control of different types of flows is henceforth enacted using a multitude of adapted technologies that not only distinguish between persons, goods, capital and information, but also between those flows that are desirable and those that are not.
This growing dissociation between border functions and border locations provides the border with a mobile dimension that breaks with its traditional fixity in time and space. We are witnessing an epistemological breakdown, from the definition of the border as a palimpsest that fixes the memory of past movements (Foucher, 2007; Raffestin, 1986b) to the analysis of mobile bordering processes that tend to focus on the ongoing changes affecting borders (Amilhat Szary & Giraut, 2011) . Whether it originated in the proliferation of flows resulting from globalization (Sheller & Urry, 2006) or in the wearing of mobile lenses to analyze them (Büscher, et al., 2011a) , the disappearance of a fixed and integrated border calls for a renewal of border studies. The conceptualization of these changes should be able to account for the emerging dissociation and crystallization processes at work and shed light on their meaning. One could say the border is becoming a complex assemblage (Allen & Cochrane, 2010; Anderson & McFarlane, 2011) , or a 'socio-technical network ' (Latour, 2005b) , and consider it as a 'collective entity associating objects, actors (migrant or border police), places and regulations' (Fourny, 2013) . However, we tend to think that this kind of interpretation could erase the very politics of border places and bordering processes. Shifting the focus from institutions to practices by emphasizing the vernacularization of borders (Perkins & Rumford, 2013) brings the individual back into borders but not necessarily his subjectivity. This extends Balibar's proposal that the border is no longer on the margins of the state but constitutes the heart of politics (Balibar, 1996) . If the border is potentially everywhere, due to the dissemination of its functions, what remains of the borderline? And can this border that is everywhere still be considered a border?
The problem thus shifts from the need to describe a phenomenon endowed with infinite variability to one of formalizing the constituent elements of a renewed epistemology. In a way, the changing focus of border studies in response to the conceptualization of the border as a more mobile entity illustrates the way in which the social sciences adapt to relativity and chaos theories, as they have to function as a basis for categories that do not have fixed limits between them. Our conceptualization of a mobile border allows for an in-depth analysis of the contradictions that the contemporary border paradigms highlight. It answers the need for a relational framework of debate and discussion by providing the notion of a device that is permanently adapting to
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3 Borderity as a technology of power: the governmentality of territorial limits Our interest in the control of flows has obviously led us to more of Foucault's work, with a focus not so much on the disciplinary axis of his analysis of power as on his governmentality approach, in particular the concepts of dispositifs , technologies and biopolitics. From Foucault's classes at the Collège de France in 1976-1977 on 'Security, Territory, Population' (Foucault, 2004) , it would appear that he tended to disregard borders: 'it is not so much about fixing limits, borders ( ... ) it is not so much about determining locations, but above all, essentially about allowing, guaranteeing, and securing flows' (p. 31). By tracing the genealogy of sovereignty and its spatial expression in the modern era, he strives to demonstrate that territory is the outcome of a disciplinary vision applied to an environment in order to regulate it. Here we propose linking his various preoccupations with flows, territory and sovereignty (which are usually understood by commentators as defining distinct socio-historical times) in a way that makes them appear to be combinable modalities (Dean, 1999) . This leads to a better understanding of his contempt for borders, as well as a possible extension of his reasoning regarding power, which helps us better understand the border.
Foucault's writings can help us to come back to the initial, classical definition of the border as an arbitrary line, which was invented to secure a balance of forces between emerging states, and to escape the frequent tautology that establishes a necessary link between territory (as a bounded space, confined by borders) and state, or between state (as a power bestowed with sovereignty over space) and territory (and its borders). When he writes that we must not reduce the state to a 'mythicized abstraction' (Dean, 1999, p. 112 ) but rather consider it as a 'regulatory idea ' (1999, p. 29) , he makes a renewed analysis of borders possible. We could use the method he developed to deconstruct a 'composite reality ' (1999, p. 112) , that of the state, to decipher that of another political category, namely borders. We base this suggestion on the fact that borders can no longer be reduced to their functions, given that the spatial characteristics of borders and functions no longer coincide, as shown above.
If borders are not disappearing today, either in the field or in rhetoric, but are instead proliferating in the name of heightened security, it leaves us with a central, very ' (2004, p. 295) .
Based on this substitution, we proceeded to re-examine Foucault's theory of governmentality as a technique of government, which led us to forge a new term, 'borderity', derived directly from Foucault's analysis of state and power. By 'borderity' we mean any technology of spatial division or socio-spatial division. In other words, borderity could be defined as the governmentality of territorial limits and their access.. This method proves very feasible in light of the ease with which one word can be replaced by the other in such central definitions: 'By [borderity] (governmentality), [we mean] the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit complex, form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge, political economy, and as its essential technical means, the apparatus [or what Foucault calls ' dispositifs '], of security ' (2004, p. 111) .
In his historical approach, Foucault shows how the state has emerged through the stabilization of a territorialization process, guaranteed by a set of diplomatic and military measures closely linked with policing. Although downplayed at the beginning of Foucault's analysis, borders do indeed appear to fit the definition of pivotal instruments of power, which can all be characterized as merging external and internal control measures. Moreover, the recent focus on technological surveillance in border studies stresses the pertinence of this link between these two levels of control (Bigo, 2002; Muller, 2011) . When the assistant director of the French border police (Police Aux Frontières) claims that 'a good border is a good set of data bases', he clearly agrees with the philosopher's stress on the use of statistics as a fundamental step in claiming power.
The semantic symmetry works but may encourage us to forget that in the field of symbolic power, the position and role of borders is distinct from that of the state. This specific location authorizes us to inquire into Copyrighted material -9781137468840
Copyrighted material -9781137468840 the political consequences of such a distinctive location of power: is there a qualitatively different exercise of governmentalizing state power at the borders?
Once again, it is very illuminating to look toward Foucault's rejection of phenomenology and his proposal to restore the time dimension within experience as a prerequisite to understanding the domination processes at work. Introducing borders into Foucault's state theory also allows us to restore space within the experience of power. Theorizing on 'borderities' opens up the possibility of suggesting that if the border is at the heart of any territorial thinking, it is not only because of its bounding and binding functions but because of its political status. The border, as a line, has not only long been dead, but it may never have even existed. When Foucault retrospectively looks at governmentality and goes back to the Greek period, he distinguishes this period from the rest of Western heritage as being the only territorial era, 'the Greek god [being] a territorial god, an intra-muros god ' (2004, p. 129) . This territorial figure, existing at the scale of the Greek scattered cities, is presented in this text as an exception, compared with the rest of the Mediterranean world where shepherds govern mobile flocks. Could borders have been only a Greek illusion?
According to G. Deleuze (Deleuze, 1990 (Deleuze, , 1995 , the end of the 20th century marked the passage from the disciplinary society that Foucault described toward a society of control. This transition can be illustrated by the transformation in the means of 'norming' society, from the use of institutional places of confinement to that of 'open networks of power' (Walters, 2006) with multiple configurations. This 'shift in the spatiality of power ' (Walters, 2006) has been thought of by many as the bypassing of bordering as a government technique. Our borderities approach nevertheless suggests that we no longer consider the border as the mere jacket of territory but one of multiple knots in the complex weaving, a way to extend the textile metaphor of politics as suggested by Plato in The Republic (part II) and discussed here by Foucault (Foucault, 2004, p. 148 ).
In such a perspective, however, individuals are not considered sovereign subjects or co-signatories of a social contract, but objects of control. Deleuze even suggested, in some of his later writings, that they should be considered 'dividuals': fragmented parts of individualities that could no longer be woven together by society. However, even if 'dividuals' are subjected to differentiated functions of networked border functions, it is important to see how each individual makes his or her way through this complexity and territorializes the border apparatus through his or her own borderities.
Borderity as a social and political quality: the territoriality of border regimes
Although borderity was first defined as a technology of power, it may also appear as a differentiated social quality, endowed with potential polity. This second aspect of the definition of the term qualifies the individual and collective relationships that are developed with respect to, and at, the border, as well as taking into account the modes of individuals' appropriation of border spaces and spatialities in a manner that goes way beyond the links traditionally established through citizenship. The second part of this conceptual delineation is not entirely removed from the Foucauldian realm in the sense that it prolongs the analysis of the 'subjectivization' process that he understood as one of the origins of power relations. In this new meaning, borderities vary according to various personal interests and statuses, references and projects. They account for the spatial expression of these variables (without eliminating the political dimension of relations), as well as opening up the possibility of taking into account the diverse imaginaries that underlie them.
In this case, borderity has to be considered by using an analogy with territoriality. Territoriality refers to both what 'makes territory' for a given space, and the individual and collective relationships with space that are developed through various appropriation practices and processes. Territory is traditionally defined as an area of material and symbolic resources that structure a level of collective being, organized both politically and semiotically (Debarbieux, 2003; Giraut, 2008; Gottmann, 1973; Raffestin, 1986a; Sack, 1986) . It can also be seen as a legal and technological expression of the economic (land) and strategic (terrain) dimensions of space (Elden, 2013) . Territoriality emphasizes the processes and relations at stake in analyzing spatial configurations, including ones that are multi-situated or networked (Giraut, 2014) .
By analogy with the territoriality of any space (expressing why and how space 'makes territory' or territorializes itself), borderity refers to what 'makes a border' within a given space, from a functional and symbolic point of view. In other words, it alludes to the ways in which a space can be characterized by the implementation and arrangement of border technologies and thus contribute to the production of a singular 'borderscape' (Rajaram & Grundy-Warr, 2007) . This new configuration is by nature unstable and in flux: it links spaces in a manner similar to that evoked by Appadurai when he suggested that his 'scapes' were a response to the mobility of the world (Appadurai, 1996) , although this
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Copyrighted material -9781137468840 configuration is more concerned with space than he was. This question was addressed by Urry, who suggested that mobility was based on a triad comprising 'networks, scapes and flows ' (Urry, 2000) . Both these texts hinted that a 'mobile border' could not be limited either to the borderlands in the vicinity of the international separation line or to the intersections of the many networks in which flows occur. This configuration should also incorporate places that are not traditionally used to anchor sovereignty rights and properties to the terrain: airports, of course, but also a luxury hotel, a convention center, a university campus, or a neighborhood inhabited by numerous immigrants. All of these places display an array of legal and technological apparatuses aimed at organizing transnational flows or, more specifically, at orienting, facilitating and controlling them.
Borderity implies that territoriality functions dialectically with extraterritoriality (Nyíri, 2009) . China provides us with a good example of both internal and external concessions: on the one hand, it created, within its national territory, 'special regions' where economic interest justifies the restriction of access to the Chinese people; on the other hand, it also has external regions, such as the Kokang region in Myanmar, that are established spaces where the Chinese language, currency and phone network are in use. In both cases, the border is mobile, being moved internally or projected externally, in a multiplicative bordering process that governs very different relations with space.
By analogy with the individual and collective dimensions of territoriality, we propose considering borderity as both an individualized and a collective relationship in the making of a differentiated and individualized border. To better understand this idea, we can refer to Paul Virilio's (Virilio & Depardon, 2009, p. 14) critique of the figure of the 'new global nomad', which is embodied by any transnational global leader from the financial, political or cultural worlds and who circulates within the network of global cities and disseminates models and trends thanks to his dominating position. Virilio shows that these global leaders, who appear to be perpetually on the move and continually crossing borders, are actually hyper-sedentary: they are at home everywhere, insofar as they move between standardized spaces and along circuits that are dedicated to them. This movement never impinges on their access to facilities such as air conditioning and wireless networks, or on their rights and privileges, including entry to business class transportation, VIP lounges, minimal queuing and visa exemptions, and easy access to citizenship in numerous countries. The issues of access and boundary crossings, and even that of sovereignty, do not exist for them -at the cost of their actions being fully traceable. At home everywhere and with a bordercrossing regime that falls under permanent exemption and traceability, their borderities seem to be very low, since they meet so few obstacles within the circuit of global cities and spaces dedicated to them.
Such global personalities, however, are not free of all borderity, since they can appear very handicapped in heterogeneous, metropolitan areas where they perceive many spaces as hostile or dangerous to their group. After the 2005 suburban riots in France, official recommendations were released concerning the potential dangers posed by crossing certain suburbs of Paris (in this case, no. 93, or the Seine-Saint-Denis 'département') on the way to the main French airport (Paris-Charles de Gaulle International Airport) from the city center. Taking a taxi became mandatory, but only following the recommendations for extreme vigilance. In post-apartheid South Africa, after the abolition of the legal system of racial segregation, and once the legal borders of the former Bantustans had been dismantled, some self-programming GPS technologies were developed and offered for sale to vehicle owners wishing to protect themselves from the risks of crossing dangerous areas. The mere possibility of being present in the ex-'black areas' of the former Bantustan districts or the townships had to be avoided. This may be seen as a virtual and voluntary re-creation of the border for security purposes. This kind of borderity belongs to, and is characterized by, people who wish to organize their mobility between desired and safe spaces, separate from hostile areas, and are ready to pay a price for it.
Refugees or 'global pariahs' involved in illegal or forced mass migrations also appear to be subjected to a permanent regime of restricted rights, or non-rights, wherever they are (Ong, 2006) . They take the border with them wherever they travel in that they are always subject to the risk of interception, detention or expulsion by legal stakeholders, but also by being dependent on smugglers or illegal crossings. Their borderity is both permanent and risky, and their crossing regime is marked by illegality and very high costs. They often rely on personal networks and cognitive capacities that entitle them to border-crossing possibilities, which determine and mitigate their borderities.
Thus we have two extreme figures, namely the 'global pariah', continually faced with prohibitions on movement and crossings, and the global leader, the hyper-sedentary sketched by Virilio as 'at home everywhere', the one that appears on the cover of this book. Those in the last group may multiply the number of borders they cross, but with the impression that they do so under conditions of free choice, whereas the first group always lives within imposed borders. These figures testify to two
Copyrighted material -9781137468840 contrasting crossing regimes that determine different individual and collective relations with the borders, that is, diverging borderities. The borderities approach also casts light on the difference between chosen and imposed borders, both in terms of everyday practices and institutional frameworks, and within the individual's spatial imaginaries. If those two extreme cases serve to demonstrate the evolution of border regimes and their impact on the conditions for polity, they do not yet fully account for their political potential. In a reticular and technologically invasive world, where resistance modalities seem to shrink alarmingly, borderities could indeed enable the subjectivities they interpellate, but how? As sketched by Olivier Razac (Razac, 2013) since it cannot escape the mobility of the border, the opposition between its legal and illegal practices is revealed to be ever more artificial. In this context, it may appear that dwelling in the mobile border could provide an efficient counter vision to the global order. Thus, if power both disables and enables political subjects, a borderities approach illuminates the question of how borders can be the site of both power and counter-power.
Borderities at work: exploratory typology of a mobile border
This analysis reveals that, far from being fuzzy, blurred or uncertain, borders have not disappeared or been politically dismantled because of their versatility. We are witnessing a complex interplay between the ordering of the world through boundaries and their government through a constant process of debordering and rebordering, which produces both multi-situated and portable global borders. To deal with this dialectical process, our approach offers an analysis of the conditions of domination that border regimes have traditionally implied through imposed technologies, as well as an assessment of the individualization of borders and personal crossing regimes (experiencing biopolitics). This is why we have coined the expression 'mobile border' to encompass the spatial instability and power characteristics of the border. This goes far beyond the study of border displacement, given that borders on maps may change as a result of war, national emancipation movements or global climate change, as in the case of the melting of glaciers on which boundaries were once based.
1
Whatever the scale of the examination of borders, they are always shown to be a means of negotiating power and a nexus of technologies, which is the reason why we have chosen to open the book with a part entitled 'Controlling Mobility. It analyzes the normative and functional power contained in 'borderities' through the use of various imposed technologies.
This power extends in multiple ways to the controlling of flows and mobility regimes (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013) . Saskia Sassen reviews the conditions under which states must now negotiate the way they exercise their sovereignty, with a number of stakeholders challenging their territoriality. The chapter focuses on a variety of emergent bordering capacities that are individually carried and associated with the recent economic and political globalization. Using Amartya Sen's notion of 'capabilities' (Sen, 1989 (Sen, , 1993 , she suggests paths for analyzing what happens when 'territory deborders territoriality' (Sassen, 2013b) . She hypothesizes that the increased deregulation of particular components that compose traditional borders has been a key factor in enabling the development of such new types of borderings, but that it is not enough to account for the new types of border-making actors.
In the third chapter, Michael Strauss discusses how extraterritorial concessions modify and reinforce sovereignty. He demonstrates how territorial assemblages do not destroy the principle of sovereignty and how nations are able to adapt to territorial reallocations outside a state's official borders. In this case, the legal debate surrounding longterm leases constitutes the boundary object, a kind of territorial experiment that can be characterized by its restricted, though not short-lived, duration. The various consequences of those leases -ranging from the achievement of peace to the creation of conditions that allow international conflict to spread -express another scale of borderities.
The fourth chapter deals with border technologies applied to spaces that are built around environmental issues. Sylvain Guyot's theorization of mobile eco-frontiers analyzes the contradictory territorial processes involved in nature appropriation. He analyzes how the many different sets of values underpinning the wilderness bring about conflicting political interests, and how territorialization enhances both mobile limits and complex networking. Both the governability and the territoriality components of borderities appear to be very relevant here, contributing to the coining of yet another parent term, that of 'environmentality'. Its different forms are produced through the dialectics of the global environmental agenda and the regime it imposes on, and/or relays by, locally grounded environmental agents; politically and spatially, they both construct geographical eco-frontier processes.
The next two chapters deal with top-down control technologies produced by national and supranational bodies and stakeholders, but not in a universal manner. These sets of conjunct techniques are to be Copyrighted material -9781137468840
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At present, a passport appears to be a nodal object in the hands of both the traveller and the border stakeholder, whether this is a border guard, an airline steward at the check-in counter or a travel agent. In his text, Jouni Häkli questions the normativity of an identification tool, from its invention to its contemporary use, in the making of borders and borderities. Using the notion of boundary object (Star & Griesemer, 1989; Star, 2010) , he suggests questioning the naturalization of the passport, not only in terms of the rights deployed within a scheme of international relations (Salter, 2003) , but within the field of multi-scalar politics.
In the subsequent chapter, Gabriel Popescu returns to the contradictory link between technology and embodiment, questioning the capacity of surveillance means to effectively ensure security. Going beyond an explanation of why such 'hard' borders will not work (Dear, 2013; Jones, 2012) , he builds on the rationale of Foucauldian technology (Razac, 2003) to examine what smart devices tell us about mobile surveillance and discusses their impact on power relations, expressed in terms of borderities. He further insists that the deployment of new tools that rely on the miniaturization of data stocks leads to the decomposition of all kinds of information, including our corporal components. In this process, our bodies are not only submitted to control (in the process of biometrics identity recognition , for example) but become these devices' means of dissemination.
In the second part of the book, 'Biopolitics. Embodying the mobile border', the discussion focuses on the experience of 'mobile borders' and the extreme differentiation of personal crossing regimes. It is framed in reference to the possible applications of biopolitics to border societies or, more broadly, to all social components engaged in border-crossing issues.
The first two chapters of this part focus on the camp and related relegation places, which have been extensively covered in recent border literature, and shift the focus from the exceptionality status that these enclosed spaces enjoy (Amoore & Hall, 2013; Le Cour Grandmaison, Lhuilier, & Valluy, 2007; Minca, 2005) , to their versatility. While historically we can show efforts have always been made to reduce the visibility of the camp, either by camouflage techniques or by a quest for rapid dismantlement that would leave no trace, it is interesting to see how the web of maritime control that the European Union is weaving across the Mediterranean can easily be concealed. In their chapter, Nicolas Lambert and Olivier Clochard detail the processes and norms that are at stake by linking a wide range of control devices deployed on the borders of Europe.
The next chapter, by Thomas Hendrick, is based on a case study of an extraterritorial logging concession, operated by a multinational timber company in the rainforest of the Democratic Republic of Congo. It explores spaces that have been cleared in pursuit of economic gain through the exploitation of natural resources. Spatial occupation is limited by the hostility of the ecosystem and the regional conflicts over the appropriation of resources, but also because of the conditions of work dictated by economic interests. Based on anthropological methods, he questions the liminality of the camp both in space and time. In so doing, the author scrutinizes the notion of 'camp' from a postcolonial African perspective and identifies it as a specific spatial manifestation of a mobile border conditioned by neoliberal extraction. Workers are trapped in enclosed areas where their political rights are limited, but while enclosing bodies, imaginaries and practices are pushed forward in a centrifugal manner. Since it is established as a place where power and norms, such as border making, escape the state, the exceptionality of the camp is strongly questioned.
There is also criticism of a fluid vision of relegation space in Chiara Brambilla's text on Euro/African urban borderscapes (Brambilla, 2015) . By analyzing the political, economic, social and cultural negotiations, and the claims and counter-claims of Senegalese migrant communities in Northern Italy, she identifies the spatial and temporal continuity of migrants' links with a wide range of global places. This brings us to a questioning of the notion of urban marginality, as the author suggests that one consider neighborhoods like Bergamo's Zingonia, not as peripheries of European cities but as liminal spaces where borderities appear to constitute an essential component of spatial and political relations.
The final chapter in this part, by Adriana Dorfman, focuses on the side of control and considers regulation processes from the point of view of illicit stakeholders. By analyzing repression policies and the territorialization of traditional and emerging modes of smuggling on the BrazilUruguay border, she examines two parallel networking movements that seldom meet: traffickers and border control officers. Since the focus is on the transit of goods that are not illegal per se, unlike drugs, for example merchandise subject to being smuggled because of differences in commercial and normative regimes, she invites us to consider borderities as a means of 'creating' border resources (Sohn, 2013) and as an interplay between often-unnoticed stakeholders in power.
The third and final part of the book, 'Dispositifs'. Interpreting complex and mobile borders , proposes complementary understandings and interpretations of the arrangements induced by borderities (Sassen, 2008; Vukov & Sheller, 2013) . These are understood as heterogeneous practices around 'boundary objects', defined as having the power to convey a common meaning. According to the previous theoretical statement and the authors' approaches, in this part we use the expression ' dispositif ' instead of assemblage in order to underline the political dimensions of arrangements induced by the mobile borders.
The chapter by Olivier Walther and Denis Retaillé challenges the un-mobile and dominant way of dealing with territories and their related borders. The paper addresses the problem from the point of view of mobilities by showing that these are not new: what has changed is that states can no longer escape from building spatial regulation models that respect them (and even encourage them). The authors undertake a broad historical retrospective of the dialectics between place and mobility within geographical thought. Building their case on African countries where the creation of states has seen a confrontation between Western and non-Western political terms of reference, they are able to contextualize the linear, traditionally Western border more effectively in order to reveal the conditions of its domination in border thinking. This leads them to suggest alternatives to the sedentary paradigm, where control relies on mobile borders.
Methodology is also at stake when trying to understand the political dimensions of the dispositifs . The mediating power of some artifacts appears essential in designing the border dispositifs around us. One of the objects to be questioned is intrinsic to the border rationale, namely the map. It has been shown how the invention of political linear borders in the modern era depended on the concomitant emergence of precise maps on which limits could be traced and therefore 'naturalized'. In her text, Sarah Mekdjian aims to divert the legitimizing function traditionally awarded to the map and instead use it to build a strong critique of the governmentality of immigration. Her use of counter-mapping techniques highlights both the performative processes at play in the drawing of a map as well as the domination processes that are illustrated on the map, which will then be either denounced or reproduced. With the help of an analysis of the results of a workshop conducted with artists and migrants, she suggests some potential paths for mapping borderities. This is one of the best examples in this book of how the spatial re-materialization of borders contributes to counter-politics in the Foucauldian sense of the word. Luiza Bialazewicz's chapter focuses on region making and governance processes. The focus is not so much on the mobility regimes that govern the Strait of Gibraltar as on the negotiations at the heart of the regionalization processes around the Mediterranean. Heterogeneous borderities can prove to be an asset when projecting a border out from the state of origin toward new political and economic horizons. The greater Tangier region appears both as a gate(way) to Europe and as its wall. The flow, its control and, above all, its imaginary are central to the analysis of 'aspirational' borderities. This case study once more underlines the inequality and selectivity of the 'mobile border', even within an international cooperation process, and leads to new theoretical perspectives.
Finally, Paolo Cuttitta's chapter appears in close relation to the previous texts, from both the first part of the book on technologies and the second one on biopolitics. This chapter examines the territorial and non-territorial borders not only of spaces but also of the international migration controls set to maintain their respect. Cuttitta's detailed enquiry into the migration control apparatus in Europe shows how the same individual who first appeared to be endowed with intense borderities can be reduced to violent confrontations with barriers of all kinds, from barbed wire to cultural codes. He discusses both the territoriality and the non-territoriality of borders, a dialectical paradigm that leads him to emphasize the individual status of bordering subjects, who carry non-territorial borders with them, whereas territorial borders perpetuate themselves through the growing multiplication of their constitutive points.
By way of conclusion, Ariane Littman, a visual artist who has in many ways embodied the 'mobile border', comments on her different artistic performances and expresses the contradictory desire for a border in her country, Israel, whose territorial complexity has so far prevented any proposed line being accepted. The way her work enters into dialogue with ours stimulates other kinds of borderities, namely of art-science explorations. This is a path that we have developed after the outline of this volume had already been established. It has led to a collective project, the antiAtlas of Borders, 2 a long-term exploration of the potential breakdowns that further interplay between social sciences and contemporary art can lead to, both in conceptual and aesthetic terms.
A borderities approach, far from cutting loose from territory, thus encourages us to think about the multiple processes of concomitant territorialization in a multi-situated way, the common characteristic of which is to escape the traditional contours of the state. The collected texts of this volume bear witness to the claim that de/rebordering and de/reterritorialization processes are not equivalent. Whatever their scale, the spaces that perform the bordering functions demonstrate that it is as impossible to dematerialize borders as to contain them in borderlands. Whether they are administrative detention camps or economic special areas, these places undergo processes of both extra and hyperterritorialization through the allocation of their bordering functions. To escape the ongoing tautological approach in border studies, which for a long time has been unable to conceptualize separately territory, state, and borders without resorting to the notion of exception, we suggest further inquiry into the transformation of power in the global age. The Foucauldian grid of interpretation that we offer to follow should help to differentiate the forms and impacts of a disseminated border that does not, however, equate to an 'everywhere', indistinct object. The pervasiveness of contemporary borders in the construction of our spatial and temporal frame of thinking, and acting, may be better understood through their mobile and individualized characteristics, defined in this book as 'borderities'. We hope this volume contributes not only to 'mobile methods' (Büscher, et al., 2011b) in the social sciences but also to a mobile epistemology of globalization. This shift in analysis from borderlines (or borderlands) to border spatialities, and from border to borderity, may prove helpful to stimulate our contemporary understanding of borders and their political potential. 
